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Abstract
Significant shifts have occurred during the past three years in the control thresholds that determine whether an acquisition of a minority shareholding will be subject to one or more EEC
competition laws. The scope and effects of these shifts are neither clear nor necessarily consistent.
The Commission appears on the one hand to have expanded the Merger Regulation’s concept of
decisive influence to reach a variety of minority shareholdings previously falling within the Philip
Morris influence standard, while on the other hand to have expanded the Philip Morris influence
standard to reach not only transactions previously thought to be passive (i.e. no influence), but
perhaps also concentrations that are normally subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Merger
Regulation, vis-à-vis Articles 85 and 86. Whether these control thresholds will continue to shift
is critically important to firms contemplating the legal certainty of their future investments. Eventually, the Commission may conclude that the potential benefits of “flexible” control thresholds
are outweighed by the costs, such as reduced legal certainty, higher transaction costs (both public
and private) and slower decisionmaking capabilities. Simpler, albeit less flexible, thresholds may
ultimately be required to control these shifting sands.
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INTRODUCTION
A common issue under all antitrust regimes is when should
a minority shareholding, either alone or combined with other
factors, trigger application of merger control and restrictive
* A version of this Article will be published in 1993 FoRDH.mLs CoRp. L. INsT. (Barry
E. Hawk ed., 1994). Copyright © Transnational Publications, Inc., 1994.
** Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Brussels. Barry Hawk is also
Director, Fordham Corporate Law Institute.
*** European Counsel, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Brussels.
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practices legislation?' Virtually all jurisdictions, including the
European Community, focus on different gradations of "control" as the principal litmus test. The boundaries of each control
threshold that triggers application of a particular jurisdiction's
antitrust laws are of fundamental importance to companies and
2
their advisors when contemplating a wide variety of investments.
EEC competition law has focused on three relevant control
thresholds: "decisive influence," "influence" and "no influence"
(i.e. a passive investment). During the past three years, there
has been a significant evolution or "shifting" of these control
thresholds, occurring primarily on two fronts.
First, the Commission of the European Community ("Commission") has expanded the concepts of sole and, especially,
joint control that are deemed to constitute "decisive influence"
under the EEC Merger Regulation.' These concepts have been
expanded to reach progressively smaller minority shareholdings
and more modest corporate governance rights. As a result, a
substantial number of minority shareholding transactions have
been shifted from potential review under Articles 85 and 86 of
the EEC Treaty to the jurisdiction of the Merger Regulation or
Member State merger control laws. 4
Second, in its recent Gillette decision 5 the Commission expanded the concept of "influence" that triggers application of
1. Minority shareholdings can take several forms, including joint ventures, "oneway" minority stock acquisitions, and cross-shareholdings. For purposes of this article,
we also include non-voting equity interests, financing arrangements, and interlocking
directors or management within the general concept.
2. The control thresholds that trigger application of Member State and other national antitrust merger control and restrictive practices legislation are outside the scope
of this Article. Several publications provide useful insight into the minority acquisition
rules of a variety of jurisdictions. See, e.g., STEPHEN AXINN ET AL., ACQUISrrIONS UNDER
THE HART-ScoTr-RoDiNO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS AcT (1993); Barry E. Hawk, Member
State Merger Controls, in II UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE, Chap. 15, Supp. 1992; J. WILLIAM RoWLEV & DONALD I.
BAKER, INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE ANTITRUST PROCESS (1991).
3. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. L 395/1 (1989), corrected version in O.J. L

257/13 (1990) [hereinafter Merger Regulation].
4. Compare, e.g., Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra, O.J. L 41/31 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 111
(representing early Commission interpretation) with, e.g., Thomas Cook/LTU/West
LB, O.J. C 199/12 (1992), Case No. IV/M.229 (Eur. Comm'n July 14, 1992) 1 8, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Oct. 1992) at 815-19 (representing one of many
joint control cases decided under Merger Regulation).
5. Warner-Lambert/Gillette and BIC/Gillette, O.J. L 116/21 (1993), reprinted in
Eur. Community Case (CCH Europe) at 2,039 [hereinafter Gillette].
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Articles 85 and 86 to acquisitions of minority shareholdings
under Philip Morris.6 This expansion of the Philip Morris influence standard occurred in two ways. The concept was expanded
to apply Article 86 to very small minority shareholdings and limited rights acquired by a dominant firm in a competitor, which
the Court ofJustice in the PhilipMomrisjudgment indicated were
either totally passive investments or, at a minimum, insufficient
to enable the acquiring firm to exercise any influence over the
commercial policies of the entity in which the minority shareholding was held.7 The Gillette decision also appears to have expanded the Philip Morris influence standard by applying Article
85, in effect via the "back door," to prohibit a concentration that
results in a so-called "artificial" geographic break-up of a competitor in an oligopolistic industry.8 The Gillette decision raises important questions regarding the future scope of these shifts in
control thresholds under EEC competition law.
I. BEFORE THE SHIFTS BEGIN: EEC CONTROL THRESHOLDS
AFTER PHILIP MORRIS
By the beginning of 1990 three control thresholds were generally acknowledged to determine the jurisdictional scope of
EEC competition laws: decisive influence, influence and no influence (passive investment).
Articles 3(1) and 3(3) of the then newly-enacted Merger
Regulation provided that a direct or indirect acquisition of sole
or joint control over another entity is deemed to be an acquisition of decisive influence - the primary prerequisite for a concentration.9 A concentration is subject either to the Merger Regulation, if the Community dimension turnover thresholds are
satisfied, or Member State competition laws, but not Articles 85
and 86.10
6. British Am. Tobacco Co. Ltd. and RJ. Reynolds Indus. Inc. v. Commission of
the European Community,Joined Cases 142/84 & 156/84, [1987] E.C.R. 4487, [1988] 4
C.M.L.R. 24 [hereinafter Philip Morris].
7. Id. at 4575-84, 1 32-64, [1988] 4 C.M.L.RI at 58-65.
8. See Gillette, 0.J. L 116/21, at 23,
7, reprinted in Eur Community Case (CCH

Europe) at 2,041,

7.

9. See Merger Regulation, supra note 3, art. 3(1) & 3(3), OJ. L 257/13, at 17
(1990). All acquisitions of sole control are concentrations under the Merger Regulation. Id. Acquisitions ofjoint control must satisfy an additional jurisdictional test (i.e.
they must be "concentrative" rather than "cooperative"). Id.
10. See id. art. 22(2) (disapplying Regulation 17's enforcement powers), art. 22(1)
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In contrast, an acquisition of a shareholding in a competitor
that does not convey decisive influence, but allows the acquiring
entity to influence the commercial activities of the acquired entity, was subject to review under Articles 85 and 86, pursuant to
the Court ofJustice judgment in PhilipMorris." A purely passive
investment, conveying no rights to exercise any influence over
the acquired entity's commercial activities, fell outside the scope
of EEC competition laws.
When the Merger Regulation was adopted, the Community
opted not to employ bright line thresholds to determine at what
point a minority shareholding passes from decisive influence to
influence to no influence over the commercial activities of the
acquired entity. For example, in its 1990 Joint Venture Notice
the Commission acknowledged these three thresholds, but focused primarily on describing the differences between sole and
joint control (i.e. different gradations of decisive influence),
rather than identifying the differences among decisive influence,
influence and no influence. 2 Thus, at the advent of the Merger
Regulation's implementation, Philip Morris was the principal
source of guidance to delineate the boundaries of these control
thresholds.
A. The Philip Morris Judgment
In 1981 Philip Morris and Rembrandt Group Limited,
which (through its wholly owned subsidiary Rothmans Holdings)
controlled Rothmans International, entered into an agreement
whereby Philip Morris would acquire 50% and the right to name
half of the board members of Rothmans Holdings. 3 Reciprocal
rights of first refusal were created, which would be triggered if
either party sought to sell all or part of its interest in Rothmans
Holdings. Philip Morris also acquired 50% of the convertible
Rothmans International bonds held by Rothmans Holdings.
(preempting application of all Member State competition laws to concentrations with a
Community dimension). O.J. L 257/13, at 24 (1990); see also Commission Notice, O.J. C
203/10, 1 7-14, 37-45 (1990) [hereinafter 1990JointVenture Notice] (reflecting Commission's oft-stated policy that Articles 85 and 86 will not be applied to concentrations).
11. Philip Morris, [1987] E.C.R. at 4577, 1 37, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 59.
12. See generally Commission Notice, supra note 10, O.J. C 203/10.
13. Philip Morris, [1987] E.C.R. at 4568, 1 3, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 52. Philip Morris
and Rothmans International were competing tobacco products suppliers in Europe. Id.
at 4492-505, 1 1-33, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 52-58.
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The parties executed cooperation agreements that contemplated joint Research & Development ("R&D"), manufacturing
and distribution of tobacco products in Europe, as well as trademark licenses that gave Philip Morris the right to exploit certain
Rothmans' brands in the Americas and South Africa.
After complaints were raised by two competitors (BAT and
R.J. Reynolds), the Commission objected that these arrangements violated Articles 85 and 86.14 The parties eventually restructured the deal to (i) reduce Philip Morris' holding to a direct 24.9% interest in the outstanding voting rights of Rothmans
International; (ii) eliminate Philip Morris' representation on the
Rothmans' board; (iii) terminate all of the cooperation agreements having any effect in the Community;' 5 and (iv) implement
various "Chinese Wall" provisions intended to insulate Rothmans
from any influence by Philip Morris. 16 The revised agreement
did not eliminate either the reciprocal rights of first refusal or
Philip Morris' holding of Rothmans International's convertible
bonds, although Philip Morris agreed to notify the Commission
of any increase in its voting interest beyond the critical 25%
threshold. 7 The Commission concluded that this arrangement
no longer allowed Philip Morris and Rothmans to coordinate
their activities and did not enable Philip Morris to influence
Rothmans.18
14. Id. The Commission perceived that the European tobacco products market
was highly concentrated and that Rothmans held a dominant position in the Benelux

countries. Id.
15. The parties did not amend agreements to cooperate in Indonesia, Malaysia
and the Philippines. Id.
16. These Chinese Wall provisions included an agreement not to seek or to accept
competitively sensitive information about or from Rothmans or to seek or to accept any
information that might influence the behavior of any of the companies in the Philip
Morris group. Id.
17. Id. The rights of first refusal were actually expanded to provide that, if either
party sold its interest to a third party, and the other party did not exercise its rights to
acquire the interest, the selling party could be forced to dispose of its entire shareholding to a single third party or to ten or more third parties. A sale by Rembrandt also
required the third party purchaser to offer to acquire all of Philip Morris' interest at the
same price.
18. Rothmans Holdings retained a direct interest of 30.8% in Rothmans International's capital, representing 43.6% of the voting rights. Id. Philip Morris also held a
direct 30.8% capital interest, but only 24.9% of the voting rights. Id. The remaining
capital and voting rights were widely dispersed among the general public. Given the
relevant corporate governance provisions, the Commission, and later the Court ofJustice, viewed this as giving Rembrandt, through Rothmans Holdings, sole control over
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BAT and RJ. Reynolds objected before the Court of Justice
that even this revised arrangement violated Articles 85 and 86.
In its judgment the Court announced that Article 85 (1) applies
to minority shareholdings in a competitor if they may "serve as
an instrument for influencing the commercial conduct of the
companies in question so as to restrict or distort competition
....
19 The Court stated that this test would be satisfied under
one of the following conditions:
(i) the shareholding results in legal (de jure) or de
facto control;
(ii) the agreement gives the acquiring firm the possibility of reinforcing its position at a later time and
thereby eventually taking effective control of the
entity;
(iii) the agreement provides for or creates a structure
likely to be used for commercial cooperation between the parties; or
(iv) the minority shareholding requires the firms to
take into consideration each other's interests
when determining commercial policy.2 0
The Court rejected the Article 85 claim on the facts, concluding, at the Commission's urging, that Philip Morris' 24.9%
interest, right of first refusal, and holding of 50% of Rothmans
International's convertible bonds did not satisfy any of these
conditions, given the remedial measures (Chinese Wall provisions and elimination of post-acquisition cooperation agreements) imposed by the Commission. 1
The Court summarily rejected the complainants' Article 86
claim. The Court acknowledged that an acquisition of a minority interest in a competitor can constitute an abuse of a dominant position, but only if the shareholding "results in effective
Rothmans International, whereas Philip Morris had "no influence" over Rothmans International's commercial behavior.
19. Id. at 4577, 37, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 59.
20. Id. at 4577 & 4579, 11 37-40 & 48, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 59-60 & 61.
21. Id. at 4577-84, 11 37-64, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 59-65. The Court rejected com-

plainants' argument that the right of first refusal constituted an Article 85(1) restriction
because it could be used by Philip Morris to prevent any other entity from acquiring a
controlling interest in Rothmans. The Court also rejected complainants' argument that
the cooperation agreements covering operations outside the Community would lead to
coordination of activities within the Community.
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control of the other company or at least in some influence on its
commercial policy." 22 The Court merely stated, without further
established that
elaboration, that its preceding Article 85 analysis
23
neither of these control thresholds was met.
B. Post-Philip Morris Commentaries and Decisions
The Philip Morris judgment elicited a variety of commentaries attempting to predict the scope of the Court's "influence"
standard.2 4 Most commentators sought primarily to identify the
upper limits of the influence standard, with the nearly universal
consensus that a variety of reasons weighed heavily against applying the standard so broadly as to allow full mergers, 100% acquisitions, or acquisitions of majority interests conveying sole control (dejure or de facto) over an acquired entity to be subject to
prohibition under Article 85.25 Except for joint bids, the Commission did not apply the Philip Morris influence standard to
such transactions.2 6
The Philip Morris judgment made it clear, however, that a
potentially broad array of acquisitions of minority shareholdings
in a competitor could trigger the influence standard. During
the three years before enactment of the Merger Regulation, the
Commission proved to be increasingly willing to apply the Philip
Morris influence standard to a growing number of minority acquisitions.
In Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra27 a joint venture agreement provided that Sofiltra would acquire a 25% interest in a competitor
(the selling parent retained a 75% interest), the right to name
22. Id. at 4584,

65, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 65.

23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Karen Banks, Mergers and PartialMergers Under EEC Law, in 1987 FoRD.
CoRp. L. INsT. 373, 425-27 (Barry E. Hawk ed. 1988) (discussing "influence" standard of
Philip Morris); Christopher Bellamy, Mergers Outside the Scope of the New Merger Regulation
Implications of the Philip MorrisJudgment, in 1988 FoRD. CORP. L. INsT. 22-1, 22-19 to
22-22 (Barry E. Hawk ed. 1989) (same); Mario Siragusa, CurrentProceduraland Litigation
Aspects of Mergers and Takeovers, in 1989 FoRD.CoRP. L. INST. 509, 518-22 (Barry E. Hawk
ed. 1990) (same).
25. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 24, at 425-27; Bellamy, supra note 24, at 22-19 to 2222; Siragusa, supra note 24, at 518-22; see alsoJoint Ventures and Mergers Under EECLaw Panel Discussion, in 1987 FoRD. CoRP. L. INST. 453, 460-61 (Barry E. Hawk ed. 1988)

(comments of Cornelis Canenbley).
26. See, e.g., Irish Distillers Group V. GC&C Brands Ltd., [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 840;
Plessey Co. v. General Electric Co., Siemens AG, [1990] E.E.C. 384.
27. Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra, O.J. L 41/31 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 111.
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two of the competitor's five board members, and the right to
name half of the members of a newly-created shareholders' committee, which would have the right to determine a variety of
commercial and investment activities of the competitor.2 8 A separate agreement provided that the competitor would manufacture products using technology licensed from Sofiltra.29 The
Commission concluded that these arrangements allowed Sofiltra
to influence the commercial conduct of the competitor and,
thus, fell within Article 85(1) .o
The Commission subsequently relied on Philip
Morris to review a variety of acquisitions of minority shareholdings. The
Commission intervened in a proposed acquisition by the French
can manufacturer, Carnaud SA, of a 66.6% interest in Sofreb, a
competing French can manufacturer, that would have resulted
in a competing German can manufacturer owning the remaining 33.3% interest, because this would have created a risk of cooperation between competitors.3 1 In another matter the Commission determined that the proposed acquisition by Danish Fur
Sales ("Danish Fur") of a 35% interest in its largest EC competitor, Hudson's Bay and Annings ("HBA"), would enable Danish
Fur to influence HBA's commercial activities, thereby triggering
application of Article 85(1).32 In a third transaction the leading
Scandinavian producer of semi-manufactured copper and copper alloy products (Outokumpu) acquired a minority interest in
the largest Spanish producer of the same products and executed
cooperation agreements contemplating rationalization of manufacturing capacity, joint marketing, and Outokumpu's eventual
exercise of options to acquire the remainder of the Spanish producer's stock.33 The Commission intervened to ensure that this
option to acquire sole control would be exercised quickly, because the minority interest and cooperation agreements created
a clear risk of coordination between independent competitors,
28. Id. at 32-33, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 114-15.
29. Id. at 33, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 115.
30. Id. at 37, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 122.
31. See Siragusa, supra note 24, at 526-27; COMMISSION NINETEENTH RiPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY 1 69 (1990). The Commission dropped its objections after
Carnaud agreed to purchase the 33.3% interest as well, thereby clearly transforming the
transaction into an acquisition of sole control. See Siragusa, supra note 24, at 526-27;
COMMISSION NINETEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY

1 69 (1990).

32. See COMMISSION NINETEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POuCY

33. See id.

65.

42 (1990).
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should the exercise of the option be delayed indefinitely. Finally, the Commission opposed KLM's acquisition of a 40% interest in a small, competing Dutch operator of scheduled and
charter flights, which included the right to appoint two of the
acquired entity's five board members and execution of a noncompetition agreement.3 4
Commentators and the Commission focused less attention
on the lower limits of the Philip Morris influence standard, where
a minority acquisition passed from "influence" to "no influence"
over a competing entity. Post-PhilipMorris decisions did not address this issue and earlier cases provided only minimal guidance. 5
Nonetheless, the Philip Morris Court clearly indicated that
an acquisition of a minority interest in a competitor, including
one holding a dominant position, alone would not satisfy the
influence standard necessary for application of Articles 85 and
86.6 Indeed, the Court's analysis in Philip Morris indicated the
following "no influence" safe harbor: an acquisition of less than
a 25% interest in a competitor, even if it includes rights of first
refusal or similar preemption rights over other shareholders' interests and a substantial holding of the acquired entity's outstanding debt (i.e. convertible bonds), nonetheless would not
trigger the Philip Morris influence standard if (i) the acquiring
firm obtained no special control (e.g., veto) rights over the acquired entity's commercial or competitive activities, beyond
those rights provided to minority shareholders under normal
34. See COMMISSION Tw wrrv-FiRsT REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1 90 (1992).
The Commission later dropped its objections after KLM provided "guarantees" that it
would deal with the acquired entity at arms length and the Dutch government agreed
to open gate access to other competitors. Id. 92.
35. See, e.g., Mecaniver/PPG, OJ. L 35/54 (1985). Mecaniver sold 81% of its
100% interest in Boussois, its French flat glass manufacturing subsidiary, to PPG, a major worldwide producer of flat glass. In addition to the retained 19% voting interest
and minority board representation in Boussois, Mecaniver had a 20% interest in a Spanish flat glass producer. Id. at 55, 1 4-7. The Commission granted a negative clearance,
finding that the transaction did not fall within Article 85(1) because (i) Mecaniver
could not influence the competitive behavior of either Boussois or the Spanish entity
given that full and effective (i.e. sole) control was vested in the majority shareholder of
each entity; (ii) the majority shareholder in each entity had an option to acquire Mecaniver's minority interests; and (iii) the Commission perceived Mecaniver's minority

interests as temporary because Mecaniver had announced its intent to withdraw from
14.
the flat glass industry. Id. at 56,
36. [1987) E.C.R. at 4577, 1 37, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 59.
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corporate governance provisions; (ii) the acquiring firm obtained no right to name any members of the acquired entity's
board or management; (iii) the transaction did not involve
agreements providing for post-closing cooperation or coordination of the parties' competing activities in the Community; 7 and
(iv) the parties implemented Chinese Wall provisions to minimize the risk of information exchanges or other methods to facilitate collusion between the parties.3 8
C. Summary
On the eve of implementation of the Merger Regulation,
the boundaries of the three control thresholds that determine
the application of EEC competition laws appeared to have
achieved a modest, albeit imperfect, degree of clarity. "Decisive
influence" clearly included full mergers, 100% acquisitions and
acquisitions of majority interests conveying sole control over the
acquired entity. The boundaries of the Philip Morris influence
standard, although far from clear, appeared to include a potentially broad array of acquisitions of minority shareholdings. The
Commission's increasingly expansive standard for minority acquisitions before implementation of the Merger Regulation suggested that the upper boundary of the influence standard, below
which decisive influence did not exist, included many transactions involving substantial minority interests (i.e. in the 25%40%+ range). 39 The Court's judgment in PhilipMorris suggested
that most acquisitions of more than a 25% interest fell above the
lower boundary of the influence standard, given that (i) they
often involve shareholders agreements allocating specific control rights to minority shareholders, and (ii) many national laws
give minority shareholders with interests above 25% minimal
control rights over a limited range of corporate issues. 4 0 Acquisi37. Id. at 4577-81, 11 41-53, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 60-62. Philip Morris and
Rothmans were allowed to retain cooperation agreements that related solely to their
52, [1988] 4
operations in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Id. at 4580,
C.M.L.R. at 62.
38. Id. at 4579, 47, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 61.
39. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text (discussing cases applying Philip
Morris standard).
40. See supra notes 13-23 (discussing 25% boundary). For example, greater than
25% minority shareholders enjoy an automatic "blocking minority" under German corporate law, allowing them to veto such non-management issues as changes to the articles of association, execution of agreements regarding distribution of profits or control
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tions of minority interests below 25% appeared to fall within the
"no influence" safe harbor if there were no agreements giving
the minority shareholder extraordinary corporate governance
rights or providing for ongoing commercial cooperation within
the Community and if there were Chinese Wall provisions or
other protections against the risk of tacit collusion. Commission
decisions since the Merger Regulation implementation have significantly altered the boundaries that appeared to exist at the
advent of the Merger Regulation's implementation.
II. THE SANDS BEGIN TO SHIFT: EXPANDING THE
CONCEPT OF DECISIVE I-NFLUENCE UNDER THE
MERGER REGULATION
Even before the Merger Regulation was implemented, certain acquisitions of minority shareholdings undoubtedly could
satisfy the Regulation's decisive influence threshold.41 However,
the scope of minority acquisitions that would satisfy the decisive
influence standard was uncertain, given that the Commission
during the prior several years appeared increasingly willing to
apply Article 85, pursuant to the Philip Morris influence standard, to a variety of minority acquisitions.42
This trend, however, was quickly reversed after the 1990 implementation of the Merger Regulation. Since that time the
Commission has adopted an increasingly expansive interpretation of the decisive influence standard to reach a growing array
of minority acquisitions, many of which before 1990 would have
fallen within the Philip Morris influence standard.4"
of the entity's operations, and the recall of members of the entity's supervisory board.
See M. HEIDENHAIN & H. SCHNEIDER, GERMAN ANTITRUST LAW 80-82, 7 271-76 (4th ed.
1991).
41. See, e.g., Merger Regulation, supra note 3, O.J. L 257/13, at 14, 3; 1990Joint
Venture Notice, supra note 10, O.J. C 203/10, at 11, 17 10-14.
42. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text (demonstrating Commission willingness to apply Article 85). The Commission's willingness to expand its application of
the Philip Morris influence standard was probably best explained by the Council's continued refusal to enact a Community merger control law.
43. Compare Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra, OJ. L 41/31 (1987) (representing early Commission interpretation according to Philip Morris standard) with Thomas Cook/LTV/
West LB,cited
in Oj C 199/12 (1992), Case No. IV/M.229 (Eur. Comm'nJuly 14, 1992)
8, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Oct. 1992) at 815-19 (representing one of
many joint control cases decided under Merger Regulation).
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A. Sole Control
Nearly all transactions involving acquisitions of sole control
are full mergers, 100% acquisitions or acquisitions of majority
interests. The issue whether an acquisition of a minority shareholding constitutes sole control has arisen only occasionally
under the Merger Regulation, primarily because such transactions typically raise joint control, rather than sole control issues.
The few decisions, however, reveal that a minority shareholder
may exercise sole control in two situations.
First, a minority shareholder may, pursuant to corporate
governance provisions, shareholders agreements or otherwise,
have the right to determine the strategic, commercial and competitive activities of the entity in which it holds the minority interest, as opposed to the right merely to determine issues that
affect only the value of the minority shareholder's investment.4 4
If the minority shareholder is the only shareholder that has the
right to determine the entity's strategic, commercial and com44. See, e.g., PepsiCo/General Mills, cited in O.J. C 228/6 (1992), Case No. IV/
M.232 (Eur. Comm'n Aug. 5, 1992)
7 reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Oct.
1992) at 838; Eridania/ISI, cited in O.J. C 204/12 (1991), Case No. IV/M.062 (Eur.
Comm'n July 20, 1991) It 3-5 reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Mar. 1992) at
303-04. The Commission has drawn a distinction between rights to determine the strategic, commercial and competitive activities of an entity (e.g., business and strategic
plans, hiring/firing of senior management) versus rights typically created under national laws that enable the minority shareholder merely to protect the value of its investment (e.g., corporate decisions affecting incorporation, changes in legal headquarters,
dissolution or winding up, dividends). See, e.g., PepsiCo/General Mills, cited in O.J. C
7; Eridania/ISI, cited
228/6 (1992), Case No. IV/M.232 (Eur. Comm'n Aug. 5, 1992)
in OJ. C 204/12 (1991), Case No. IV/M.062 (Eur. Comm'n July 20, 1991)11 3-5.
The term "strategic, commercial and competitive activities" is used throughout this
article to describe the category of issues and activities focused upon by the Commission
in its sole and joint control analyses. See, e.g., Ericsson/Hewlett-Packard, cited in O.J. C
83/5 (1993), Case No. IV/M.292 (Eur. Comm'n Mar. 12, 1993) 1 6; Philips/Thomson/
SAGEM, cited in O.J. C 22/2 (1993), Case No. IV/M.293 (Eur. Comm'nJan. 18, 1993) 1
11, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Apr. 1993) at 986; Harrisons & Crosfield/
AKZO, cited in O.J. C 128/5 (1993), Case No. IV/M.310 (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 29,1993) 1
7. Although the types of issues and activities within this category have remained constant, the Commission (especially in recent cases) has used a variety of different "labels"
to describe the category. See, e.g., Ericsson/Hewlett-Packard, cited in O.J. C 83/5
(1993), Case No. IV/M.292 (Eur. Comm'n Mar. 12, 1993) 1 6 ("fundamental business
decisions and .. . commercial and competitive strategy"); Philips/Thomson/SAGEM,
cited in O.J. C 22/2 (1993), Case No. IV/M.293 (Eur. Comm'n Jan. 18, 1993) 1 11
("major strategic decisions"); Harrisons & Crosfield/AKZO, cited in O.J. C 128/5
(1993), Case No. IV/M.310 (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 29, 1993) 17 ("important policy matters").
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petitive activities, it has sole control.4 5
Second, if the minority shareholder does not enjoy such
rights, it will be deemed to acquire sole control over the entity
only when (i) the remaining shareholder interests are widely dispersed among numerous other shareholders, rather than one or
a few other significant shareholders; (ii) a sufficiently small percentage of these other shareholders vote at shareholder meetings, so that the minority shareholder's interest is likely to represent a majority of all votes cast at future meetings; and (iii) no
other shareholder is deemed to share joint control over the ac46
quired entity.
Arjomari-Prioux/Wiggins Teape Appleton,4 7 one of the first decisions under the Merger Regulation, illustrates an early application of these principles. Although Arjomari had no extraordinary control rights, the Commission found that Arjomari's acquisition of a 39% voting stock interest in Wiggins Teape
constituted an acquisition of sole control because the remaining
61% was widely dispersed among 107,000 other shareholders,
with the next largest shareholder owning slightly less than a 4%
48
interest.
The Commission expanded its analysis a year later in Mediobanca/Generali.49 The Commission considered whether Mediobanca's increase in its voting stock interest in Generali from
5.98% to 12.84% constituted an acquisition of sole control.5 °
The parties claimed, and the Commission accepted, that Mediobanca enjoyed no special control rights over Generali (such as
45. E.g., CCIE/GTE, cited in O.J. C 258/12 (1992), Case No. IV/M.258 (Eur.
Comm'n Sept. 25, 1992)
2-9, reprintedin EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Jan. 1993) at
113-15, 119-20 (setting forth Commission finding that 19% shareholder exercised sole
control, where 81% shareholder, an investment banking firm, had ceded extraordinary
control rights to minority shareholder, including veto right over all board and shareholder issues, and had delegated all its management powers to two executive employees
of acquired entity).
46. E.g., Mediobanca/Generali, cited in OJ. C 334/23 (1991), Case No. IV/M.159
(Eur. Comm'n Dec. 19, 1991) 11 6-11, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Oct.
1991) at 23.
47. Ajomari-Prioux/Wiggins Teape Appleton, cited in O.J. C 321/16 (1990), Case
No. IV/M.025 (Eur. Comm'n Dec. 10, 1990)
4, rqpinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL
REP. (Oct. 1991) at 23.
48. Id.
49. Mediobanca/Generali, cited in O.J. C 334/23 (1991), Case No. IV/M.159
(Eur. Comm'n Dec. 19, 1991) 1 6-11, reprinted in, EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Apr.
1992) at 610-11.
50. Id.
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veto rights under supermajority clauses or the right to name directors or management).
However, because the 12.84% interest would represent the largest, or one of the largest, individual
shareholdings in Generali, the Commission compared the size of
this shareholding to the total shareholder interests that normally
participated in ordinary shareholders meetings.5 2 During the
previous five years, between 26.4% and 34.4% of total shareholder interests had voted at ordinary shareholder meetings, a
range that the Commission assumed would likely increase by the
percentage Mediobanca proposed to acquire (i.e., the range
would likely increase to between 33.24% and 41.24%). 5s The
Commission concluded that there was no possibility for Mediobanca to exercise sole control because the 12.84% interest
could not alone constitute a majority at shareholders meetings
where at least 33% of total shareholder interests would be vot54
ing.
In mid-1993 the Commission refined its analysis even further in Sociiti Gnfrale de Belgique/Gdnrale de Banque.55 SGB increased its voting stock interest in GDB from 20.94% to 25.96%
by acquiring 725,000 shares from GDB's next largest shareholder (AG Group), whose interest declined from 14.69% to below 5%.56 The Commission first noted that, before the transaction, neither SGB nor any other entity exercised control over
GDB within the meaning of Article 3(3) because, at the last
three shareholder annual meetings, SGB's 20.94% interest represented only 43.02%, 47.68% and 45.70% of the total shares
voted (present or represented) at the meeting. SGB argued in
51. Id. The Commission also found that there were no shareholders agreements
providing for block voting or other "pooling" of Mediobanca's minority interest with
the interests of other shareholders, which might indicate that Mediobanca and other
shareholders exercised joint control over Generali. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. Three other minority shareholders in Generalisubsequently filed an unsuccessful suit with the Court of First Instance alleging that Mediobanca had failed to reveal a de facto block voting agreement with another shareholder, which allegedly enabled them to exercise joint control. See Zunis Holding S.A. v. Commission, Case No. T83/92 (CL First Instance Oct. 28, 1993) (not yet reported).
55. Soci6t6 Gn6rale de Belgique/Gen6rale de Banque, Case No. IV/M.343 (Aug.
3, 1993)
5-14.
56. AG Group also divested 1.14 million shares in GDB to other shareholders,
none of which apparently held more than 5% of GDB after the transactions were completed.
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its Form CO notification that, after the transaction, its 25.96%
interest would represent 56.62% of the total shares voted at the
shareholders meetings, even assuming (1) all GDB shares retained by AG Group or sold to other shareholders would be
voted, and (2) all other shareholders would vote the same percentage of their interests as at the last shareholders meeting.
The Commission, while neither accepting nor rejecting these assumptions, agreed that SGB would likely be able to exercise
more than 50% of the voting rightsactually cast at future shareholders meetings, even under the more stringent assumption
that all shareholders holding more than a 0.06% interest in GDB
5 7
would vote their entire interest at the shareholders meeting.
The Commission concluded that SGB would therefore be able to
exercise sole control over GDB, given that a majority vote by
shareholders determined the composition of GDB's Management Board, which in turn determined such strategic issues as
58
the business plan and budget.
B. Joint Control
The Commission has been paricularly expansive in its application of the joint control concept of Article 3 to progressively
smaller minority shareholdings and related control rights. As a
result, minority shareholdings in the 10%-25% range, and in
some cases even lower, have been found to constitute joint control. In these situations the Commission has relied on two joint
control tests, which for descriptive convenience we have labelled
the "unilateral rights" and "shifting alliances" joint control tests.
Under the "unilateral rights" test, a minority shareholder
may exercise joint control if, through corporate governance provisions, shareholders agreements or otherwise, it has either positive control or, at a minimum, negative control, such as a veto or
approval right, over the strategic, commercial and competitive
57. Indeed, the Commission noted that a total of 900,000 votes would have to be
cast by shareholders holding individual interests below 0.06% in order for SDB's interest
to fall below 50% of votes cast at future shareholders meetings, which was extremely
unlikely given that such shareholders, as a group, had never cast more than 200,000
votes at prior meetings. The group collectively held 54.12% of GDB's outstanding
shares.
58. Control was not defeated by the fact that Belgian banking laws required that
GDB's board membership be approved by a government commission because the
board retained the power to determine GDB's strategic, commercial and competitive
policies.
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activities of the entity in which it holds the minority interest.59 If
at least one other shareholder is deemed to exercise positive or
negative control over the entity's strategic, commercial and competitive activities, the entity is jointly controlled.6'
Under the "shifting alliances" test, joint control may exist if,
through a holding company, block voting agreements or other

"pooling" arrangements, (i) the minority shareholder "groups"
its interest with the interests of one or more other shareholders,
(ii) there is no possibility of "shifting alliances" between these

"grouped" interests, and (iii) in the aggregate the grouped interests have the right to exercise either positive or negative control

over the strategic, commercial and competitive activities of the
entity in which the interests are held.
A typical application of the "unilateral rights" test is
presented in Thomas Cook/LTV/West LB, 6 where a travel agency
acquired 90% of another travel agency and a bank acquired the
remaining 10%. The bank was deemed to share joint control
because the shareholders agreement gave it extraordinary unilateral control rights over the acquired entity.62 The same principles were applied to find joint control in Northern Telecom/Matra
Telecommunication,63 a two-parent joint, venture involving 80%
and 20% interests.6 4
59. See, e.g., Thomas Cook/LTU/West LB, cited in O.J. C 199/12 (1992), Case No.
IV/M.229 (Eur. Comm'n July 14, 1992) 1 8, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP.
(Oct. 1992) at 815-19. Negative control rights, such as veto or prior approval rights,
may be contrasted with positive control rights, such as the right to appoint key management or to define commercial policy. Joint control often exists when one shareholder,
typically the majority shareholder, has positive control that is subject to a potential exercise of the minority shareholder's negative (veto) control rights.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. The bank had (i) the right to name five of the entity's ten directors, the 90%
shareholder had the right to name only two directors and the remaining three directors
were to be jointly named; and (ii) a further right to name the chairman of the board,
who would have a casting vote. Id. The consent of both shareholders was required for
strategic, commercial, and competitive decisions, such as approval of the acquired entity's annual and five-year business plans, material changes in the entity's business, major financial and acquisition/divestiture proposals and hiring/firing of senior employees. The bank also loaned most of the funds to allow the other parent to acquire its
90% interest.
63. Northern Telecom/Matra Telecommunication, cited in O.J. C 240/15 (1992),
6-7, reprinted in EEC MERGER
Case No. IV/M.249 (Eur. Comm'n Aug. 10, 1992)
CoNTRoL REP. (Apr. 2, 1993) at 851-52.
64. Northern Telecom's initial 20% investment in Matra's existing telecom subsidiary included (i) an option to increase the interest by at least another 20% by the end of
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Variations of the "shifting alliances" test have been applied
in several cases. In some situations minority shareholdings are
literally pooled into a holding company to enable the aggregated interest to exercise control over the acquired entity.6 5 In
other cases the minority shareholders execute agreements that
require the shareholders either to vote together as a block or to
require unanimous votes, which ensure that all parents must
agree on the acquired entity's strategic, commercial and competitive activities.6 6
Commission commentators have indicated that at least one
of these joint control tests must be satisfied in order for joint
control to be found.6 7 Indeed, in a few cases where two or more
shareholders did not each have either positive or negative control rights over the acquired entity's strategic, commercial and
competitive activities and there was a risk of "shifting alliances,"
1997; and (ii) a shareholders agreement provision that all fundamental business decisions, business plans and budgets, and appointment of the venture's chairman required
unanimous parental approval. Id.
65. See, e.g., UAP/Transatlantic/Sun Life, cited in O.J. C 296/12 (1991), Case No.
IV/M.141 (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 11, 1991) 11 6-10, reprinted'in EEC MERGER CONTROL
REP. (Apr. 1992) at 485-86 (parents contribute separate 27.7% interests in Sun Life to
newly formed holding company that is 50-50% owned and jointly controlled by parents); ABC/Generale des Eaux/Canal/W.H. Smith TV, cited in 0.J. C 244/5 (1991),
Case No. IV/M.110 (Eur. Comm'n Sept. 10, 1991) 1 5-7 & 9, reprinted in EEC MERGER
CONTROL REP. (Mar 1992) at 361-63 (ESPN, Gdl and Canal+ acquire W.H. Smith's
television sports programming business by forming CV1, which is 50-50% owned by
ESPN and CV2, a separate holding company that is 50-50% owned by CdI and Canal+;
Commission finds CVI to be jointly controlled by ESPN, GdI and Canal+ because CV2 is
jointly controlled by Gdl and Canal+).
66. See Sunrise, cited in O.J. C 18/15 (1992), Case No. IV/M.176 (Eur. Comm'n
Jan. 13, 1992) 11 11-13 & 15, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL RaP. (Apr. 1992) at
622-23 (unanimity required among five parents each holding between 15% and 25%
interests); Kelt/American Express, cited in OJ. C 223/38 (1991), Case No. IV/M.116
(Eur. Comm'n Aug. 20, 1991) 5, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTrOL REP. (Mar. 1992)
at 341-42 (unanimity required among eight parents holding unstated minority interests); Drfger/IBM/HMP, cited in O.J. C 236/6 (1991), Case No. IV/M.101 (Eur.
Comm'nJune 28, 1991) 1 4, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL RaP. (Dec. 1991) at 233
(unanimity required among three parents each holding 33.3% interest); see also JCSAT/SAJAC, Case No. IV/M.346 (Eur. Comm'n June 30, 1993) 1 4-5 (joint control
found to be shared by four largest shareholders, holding 27%, 23%, 22% and 22%
interests, where each minority shareholder had right to name two of venture's ten
board members, but the unanimous consent of all four shareholders was required for
(i) naming remaining two board members, and (ii) such matters as determination of
venture's medium and long term management plans and all important issues relating
to management of venture).
67. See Christopher Jones & F. Enrique Gonzilez-Difiz, THE EEC MERGER REGULATION § 1.2.2 (Colin Overbury ed., 1992).
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the Commission has indicated that joint control is absent.6"
Nonetheless, several more recent cases suggest that the Commission may be applying these tests more flexibly, thereby further
expanding the range of minority shareholdings that constitute
joint control under the Merger Regulation.
For example, the Commission has found that a minority
shareholder exercises joint control, despite the fact that neither
69
the "unilateral rights" nor "shifting alliances" test was met.
Avesta/British Steel/NCC/AGA/AxelJohnson involved a newly formed
joint venture in which the ownership structure was 40%, 25.1%,
7.54%, 7.23% and the remainder was widely dispersed to the
public. 70 The Commission found that the four largest shareholders, including the two 7%-8% shareholders, exercised joint
control, even though the shareholders agreement provided that
approval of each of the two largest shareholders and only one of
the two 7%-8% shareholders was required for strategic, commercial and competitive issues, such as approval of the joint venture's annual operating budget and business plan, appointment
or dismissal of the venture's Managing Director and acquisitions
or sales exceeding a certain value. 7 ' Similarly, in Philips/Thomson/SAGEM71 the Commission found joint control to be shared
among an 80% and two 10% shareholders, even though the
68. See Eureko, cited in

OJ. C 113/12 (1992), Case No. IV/M.207 (Eur. Comm'n

Apr. 27, 1992) 11 6-12, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Aug. 1992) at 748-49
(Commission indicates that joint control is probably absent where four insurance companies form joint venture in which they will hold approximately equivalent minority
interests and none will have extraordinary veto or other control rights; Commission
emphasizes that virtually all fundamental decisions of board and at shareholders meetings are subject to simple majority votes, thereby creating risk of "changing alliances");
Koipe-Tabacalera/Elosua, cited in O.J. C 227/10 (1992), Case No. IV/M.117 (Eur.
Comm'n July 28, 1992) 11 6-9, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Jan. 1993) at
828-24 (Commission indicates that joint control is not present where Spanish state and
private company will each acquire 40% of Elosua, with Elosua's workers council holding
remaining 20%, where there are no corporate governance rights giving any shareholder positive or negative control rights over Elosua's strategic, commercial, and competitive activities and there is clear risk of shifting alliances because such activities are to
be decided by simple majority votes).
69. Avesta/British Steel/NCC/AGA/Axel Johnson, cited in O.J.
C 258/9 (1992),
Case No. IV/M.239 (Eur. Comm'n Sept. 4, 1992)
7-12, reprinted in EEC MERGER
CONTROL REP. (Jan. 1993) at 874-75.
70. Id.
71. Id. Thus, neither 7%-8% shareholder had a negative veto right and there was a
risk of shifting alliances, since the consent of only one of these shareholders was sufficient to implement any action proposed by the two largest shareholders.
72. Philips/Thomson/SAGEM, cited in OJ. C 22/2 (1993), Case No. IV/M.293
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shareholders agreement required merely a supermajority vote
just above 80% on strategic joint venture decisions.7 3
Other decisions suggest that the Commission may be willing
to find the "unilateral rights" test to be satisfied even if the minority shareholder has a veto or other control right over only
one, or a very few, of the issues that have been identified by the
Commission as determining an acquired entity's strategic, com74
mercial and competitive activities. In Ericsson/Hewlett-Packard
the majority (60%) shareholder had the right to name four of
the acquired entity's seven board members. All board and shareholder votes were by simple majority, except for a limited
number of issues requiring unanimity.7 5 Although all but one of
the unanimity issues listed in the decision are types that the
Commission in previous cases has identified as merely protecting
the value of a minority shareholder's investment (i.e. not affecting the entity's strategic, commercial or competitive activities),
the Commission nonetheless found the minority shareholder to
enjoy joint control because the one remaining unanimity issue
was approval of the acquired entity's business plan or budget an issue that the Commission has consistently described as affecting strategic, commercial and competitive activities.7 6
(Eur. Comm'n Jan. 18, 1993) 11 8-11, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Apr.
1993) at 986.
73. Thus, the majority shareholder needed only the consensus of one of the two
10% shareholders, creating a clear risk of shifting alliances. Id.
74. Ericsson/Hewlett-Packard, cited in O.J. C 83/5 (1993), Case No. IV/M.292
(Eur. Comm'n Mar. 12, 1993) 6 reprintedin EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (May 1993) at
1007.
75. Id.
76. Id. Indeed, the Commission has indicated in other decisions that a veto or
approval right over the business plans of an entity is perhaps the most significant power
affecting the entity's strategic, commercial and competitive activities. See Ingersoll
Rand/Dresser, cited in O.J. C 86/15 (1992), Case No. IV/M.121 (Eur. Comm'n Dec. 18,
1991)
8, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 1992) at 538;
Saab Ericsson Space, cited in O.J. C 17/10 (1992), Case No. IV/M.178 (Eur. Comm'n
Jan. 13, 1992)
4-6, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Apr. 1992) at 627-28.
It should be noted that the minority shareholdings in all three cases were relatively
high (40%, 40% and 49%, respectively). Ericsson/Hewlett-Packard, cited in OJ. C 83/5
(1992), Case No. IV/M.292 (Eur. Comm'n Mar. 12, 1993) 6; Ingersoll Rand/Dresser,
cited in O.J. C 86/15 (1992), Case No. IV/M.121 (Eur. Comm'n Dec. 18, 1991)
8,
reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 1992) at 538; Saab Ericsson
Space, cited in O.J. C 17/10 (1992), Case No. IV/M.178 (Eur. Comm'n Jan. 13, 1992)
4-6, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Apr. 1992) at 627-28. This might suggest an inverse relationship between the size of the minority shareholding and the mag-
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Fletcher Challenge/Methanex" also suggests that the Commission is increasingly willing to find joint control even in situations
where it is uncertain whether at least two shareholders satisfy
one of the Commission's joint control tests.78 Metallgesellschaft
AG ("MG") owned 32% of Methanex, with the remaining interests widely dispersed among the public.7 9 Fletcher Challenge
("Fletcher") and Methanex agreed that Fletcher would contribute its worldwide methanol business to Methanex in exchange
for a stock issue that would give Fletcher a 44% interest in
Methanex and dilute MG's interest to 10%.8 0 Fletcher and MG
executed a separate shareholders agreement providing that
Fletcher would nominate five Methanex directors, MG would
nominate three directors and they would jointly nominate the
three remaining directors.8 " All board issues, however, were subject to simple majority votes.8 2 Nonetheless, the shareholders
agreement also provided that (i) Fletcher and MG would jointly
name the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the board;8 1 (ii)
Fletcher and MG would vote together at shareholders meetings
in favor of all simple, non-extraordinary proposals made by the
board that were subject to shareholder approval; and (iii)
Fletcher and MG had mutual rights of first offer and refusal, as
well as take along rights, regarding transfers of the other's interest.8 4 These minimal control rights were deemed sufficient to
enable MG, with its mere 10% interest, to exercise joint control
over Methanex. s5
The occasional case also suggests that the Commission may
be willing in certain circumstances to find the "unilateral rights"
test satisfied even when the minority shareholder has no formal
veto or approval right over the acquired entity's strategic, comnitude or number of strategic, commercial, and competitive issues over which the minority shareholder must have a veto right in order to satisfy the first joint control test.
77. Fletcher Challenge/Methanex, cited in 0.J. C 98/12 (1993), Case No. IV/
M.331 (Eur. Comm'n Mar. 31, 1993).
78. Id.
79. Id. 6.
80. Id. 7.
81. Id. 8.
82. Id. 8(iii).
83. Id. 1 8. For the first two years the Chairman would be a MG nominee and the
Deputy Chairman would be a Fletcher nominee. Thereafter, Fletcher would name the
Chairman and MG the Deputy Chairman. Id. 10.
84. Id. 8.
85. Id. 1 11.
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mercial and competitive activities. In Sanofi/Sterling Drug 6 the
Commission found that the minority shareholder in a 70%-30%
venture shared joint control even though (i) all board and shareholder votes were by simple majority, (ii) the minority shareholder could name only three of the venture's eight board members, and (iii) the board, before making any decisions to close
plants, to make acquisitions or divestitures, or to adopt its business plans, was required merely to consult the minority shareholder, who, in other words, had no veto right."7 The absence of
other decisions relying on only a prior consultation, as opposed
to prior approval right, to find joint control suggests, however,
that the future scope of this "exception" is extremely limited."a
In other situations the Commission has suggested that an
extremely small or even non-existent shareholding may nonetheless trigger the joint control threshold if special corporate governance provisions or shareholders agreements give the minority
shareholder extraordinary control rights. Although the Commission has not expressly found a minority shareholding below
86. See Sanofi/Sterling Drug, cited in 0J. C 156/10 (1991), Case No. IV/M.072
(Eur. Comm'n June 10, 1991) 1 7, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Jan. 1992)
at 191 (stating minority shareholding is joint control).
87. Compare id. 1 7 with Ericsson/Hewlett-Packard, cited in 0.J. C 83/5 (1992),
Case No. IV/M.292 (Eur. Comm'n Mar. 12, 1993) 1 6, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL RE'. (Apr. 1993) at 985 (minority shareholder was given right to be consulted
about identity of General Manager to be appointed by majority shareholder; Commission cites this as one of several factors establishing joint control).
88. Compare Sanofi/Sterling Drug, cited in 0J. C 156/10 (1991), Case No. IV/
M.072 (Eur. Comm'n June 10, 1991) 1 7, with DASA/Fokker, cited in OJ. C 136/4
(1993), Case No. IV/M.237 (Eur. Comm'n May 10, 1993) 11 4-5 & 8 (setting forth
Commission finding that Daimler-Benz/DASA acquired sole control of Fokker when it
acquired 51% interest and Dutch Government retained 49% interest). The Commission found that the Government did not retain joint control over Fokker, even though
a supermajority of supervisory board votes was required for such decisions as changes in
Fokker's role as lead company for certain aircraft projects or terminations of its existing
programs for producing jet aircraft. DASA/Fokker, cited in O.J. C 136/4 (1993), Case
No. IV/M.237 (Eur. Comm'n May 10, 1993)
4-5 & 8. Joint control was absent because (i) Daimler-Benz/DASA could achieve this supermajority with either the votes of
the two independent board members appointed by Fokker's labor unions or one independent board member and the member appointed by the Government (i.e. potential for shifting alliances); and (ii) the Government had agreed not to oppose decisions
relating to termination of existing aircraft programs if such programs were uneconomical. Id. Thus, the Commission concluded that the Government did not retain any right
to veto Fokker's business decisions on its own. Id. Clearly, however, the Government
had at least the equivalent of the prior consultation right in Sanofi/SterlingDrug. Sanofi/Sterling Drug, cited in O.J. C 156/10 (1991), Case No. IV/M.072 (Eur. Comm'n

June 10, 1992)

7, reprinted in EEC

MERGER CONTROL

REP. (Jan. 1992) at 191.
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5% to enjoy joint control, at least one decision indicates that
such shareholdings can meet the joint control test if they are

accompanied by a sufficiently large number of veto rights or
other means to determine the acquired entity's strategic, commercial and competitive activities.8 9
C. Summary
A comparison of these and other Merger Regulation decisions9 ° with pre-Merger Regulation decisions applying PhilipMorris indicates that the Commission has become increasingly willing to find that minority shareholdings constitute an acquisition
of decisive influence, even though many of the same minority
shareholdings, before implementation of the Merger Regulation, would have been found to satisfy the lower Philip Morris
influence standard. 9 ' This substantial and ongoing shift is not
surprising.
Before implementation of the Merger Regulation, the Commission had a strong incentive to find that an acquisition of a
minority shareholding conveyed only influence because a finding of either decisive influence or no influence would have
greatly restricted the Commission's jurisdictional options to review the transaction.9 2 In contrast, after implementation of the
89. See Volkswagen AG/V.A.G. (UK) Ltd., cited in

O.J.

C 38/12 (1993), Case No.

IV/M.304 (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 24, 1993) 1 4, reprinted in EEC

MERGER CONTROL REP.

(Apr. 1993) at 995 (where VW proposed to acquire 100% of voting stock of VAG from
Lonrho, Commission noted that acquisition would involve a change from joint control
to sole control over VAG; Commission found that VW already exercised joint control
over VAG, despite owning none of its stock, because VW was represented on "Coordination Committee which takes joint decisions on major issues of [VAG's] commercial policy.").
90. See, e.g., Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez/Brochier, cited in O.J. C 188/20 (1991),
Case No. IV/M.076 (Eur. Comm'n July 11, 1991)
4-5, reprintedin EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Mar. 1992) at 247-48 (25.1% minority interest found to share joint control);
CONAGRA/IDEA, cited in O.J. C 175/18 (1991), Case No. IV/M.010 (Eur. Comm'n
May 30, 1991) It 5-6, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Jan. 1992) at 167-68
(26% interest found to share joint control); Apollinaris/Schweppes, cited in O.J. C 203/
14 (1991), Case No. IV/M.093 (Eur. Comm'n June 24, 1991)
6, reprinted in EEC
MERGER CONTROL REP. (Jan. 1992) at 220 (28% interest found to share joint control).
91. See supra notes 13-34 and accompanying text (discussing Philip Morris and preMerger Regulation cases applying "influence" standard).
92. There was no Merger Regulation and, pursuant to the Court of Justice judgment in Continental Can, Article 86 could be applied only if one of the parties already
held a dominant position. See Europemballage & Continental Can Co. v. Commission,
Case 6/72, 1973 E.C.R. 215, (1973] C.M.L.R. 199. For most transactions this left Article
85, which the Philip Morris Court had indicated did not apply if no influence was ac-
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Merger Regulation there has been an equally strong incentive to
find that transactions involving minority shareholdings create
decisive influence, given the well-recognized procedural, substantive and remedial advantages of the Merger Regulation vis-Avis Articles 85 and 86. The result has been a significant and
welcome expansion of the decisive influence standard to reach a
growing number of minority acquisitions and a corresponding
contraction of the universe of minority shareholdings that satisfy
the Philip Morris influence standard.
Indeed, given the Commission's increasing proclivity to find
decisive influence in a variety of transactions involving minority'
shareholdings in the 10%-25% range, one might wonder
whether the Merger Regulation's decisive influence standard has
largely overlapped the Philip Morris influence standard, leaving
little more than two control thresholds, decisive influence and
no influence/passive investment. Rumors of the demise of the
Philip Morris influence standard would be premature, however,
in light of the new life that has been breathed into that standard
by the Commission's recent Gillette decision.
III. SHAVING TOO CLOSELY IN A SANDSTORM? GILLE7TE'S EXPANSION OF THE PHILIP MORRIS
INFLUENCE STANDARD
In 1989 Gillette, the world leader in wet shaving products,
faced an opportunity to acquire a major competitor, the Wilkinson Sword wet shaving products business, from Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB. 9 4 Although the Merger Regulation was
not yet enacted, Gillette apparently realized that an attempt to
acquire Wilkinson's EC operations would likely elicit EC and
quired. Virtual universal opposition had developed against its potential application to
acquisitions of decisive influence such as full mergers and acquisitions. See supra notes
26-28 and accompanying test (discussing Philip Morris decision and Article 85).
93. See supra notes 41-89 and accompanying text. The procedural, substantive and
remedial differences between the Merger Regulation and Articles 85 and 86, as well as
the Commission's recent attempts to reduce those differences, are outside the scope of
this article, but are the partial subject of the authors' recent article in the Common
Market Law Review. See Hawk & Huser, A Bright Line Shareholding Test to End the
Nightmare Under the EECMerger Regulation, [1993] 30 C.M.L.R. 1155 (1993); see also Barry
E. Hawk, Mergers, Acquisitions and ConcentrativeJoint Ventures, in COMPARATIVE GUIDE,
supra note 2, ch. 13.
94. See Gillette, O.J. L 116/21, at 23, 8 and accompanying table, reprinted in Eur.
8 and accompanying table.
Community Cases (CCH Europe) at 2,041,
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Member State opposition, given the substantial Community market shares held by Gillette and Wilkinson in this highly oligopolistic industry.95
The parties initially structured their transaction so that Gillette would acquire Wilkinson's operations in North America
and the rest-of-the-world outside the EC, while a managementled investor group, eventually called Eemland Holdings NV,
would acquire the EC operations. After objections by the U.S.
Department of Justice, Wilkinson's operations in the United
States were included among the operations to be sold to Eemland and certain terms of Gillette's participation in Eemland's
leveraged buy-out were modified pursuant to a Justice Department consent decree.9 6
After complaints were filed in early 1990 by competitors,
BIC SA and Warner Lambert's Schick subsidiary, the EC Commission opened an investigation of the transaction. Three years
later, the Commission concluded that Gillette's participation in
the Eemland buy-out violated Article 86 (but not Article 85) and,
separately, that Gillette's 100% acquisition of the Wilkinson operations in European countries outside the EC violated Article
85 (but not Article 86). In so doing, the Commission appears to
have significantly expanded the lower and, possibly, the upper
boundaries of the Court's Philip Morris influence standard.
A. Shifting the Lower Boundary of the Philip Morris Influence
Standard: "Some" Influence Under Article 86
There is little doubt that Gillette carefully structured the
scope of its participation in Eemland's buy-out to fall below the
influence threshold, and thus within the no influence or passive
investment "safe harbor," outlined by the Court of Justice in
Philip Morris. By structuring the transaction in this manner, Gillette sought to avoid triggering the Philip Morris influence
threshold, below which the Court had indicated neither Article
95. Id. Whether measured by value or volume of sales, Gillette's EC-wide and
Member State market shares for wet shaving products, with rare exceptions, ranged
between 50% and 90%. Id. Wilkinson's shares were significant in nearly every Member
State, especially Germany, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. Id. On an EC-wide basis,
Gillette and Wilkinson were the two largest suppliers, measured by value. Id.
96. See United States v. Gillette Co., 1990-2 Trade Cases (CCH)
69,142 (D.D.C.
July 25, 1990).
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85 nor Article 86 applied.9 7
Gillette acquired no voting stock or other voting interest in
Eemland, no board or management representation, and no access to any internal, non-public Eemland information. Instead,
Gillette (i) acquired a 22% non-voting "loan stock" equity interest that was convertible to voting stock only under limited conditions; 98 (ii) loaned about 13.6% of Eemland's total debt financing at what appeared to be favorable non-market terms; 99 (iii)
acquired certain preemption rights that gave Gillette an option
to acquire (or force to be sold to a selected third party) any voting stock in Eemland that a shareholder eventually might seek to
sell; (iv) entered into a two-year supply agreement, whereby it
purchased Wilkinson products manufactured by Eemland for resale by Gillette outside the EC and North America; and (v) entered into a "non-Community sale agreement" and an intellectual property agreement, pursuant to which the "rest-of-theworld" Wilkinson operations and trademarks were assigned to
Gillette.1 0 0 Each party agreed not to sell products under the Wilkinson trademark outside its respective territories, and the parties agreed to cooperate to resolve any problems that might arise
from multinational customers seeking to purchase their requirements for both territories from one or the other supplier.
In its consent decree with the U.S. Justice Department, Gillette also accepted a variety of Chinese Wall and standstill provisions. 10 1 Gillette agreed, for as long as it held any interest in
Eemland, not to exchange information regarding prices and
other terms of sale in the United States, not to exercise any influence over Eemland and not to do anything to cause Eemland to
become insolvent.10 2 Gillette further agreed, for a period of ten
years, not to acquire any additional interest in any "securities" of
97. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text (discussing Philip Morris).
98. Gillette, Oj. L 116/21, at 25,
13, reprinted in Eur. Community Cases (CCH
Europe) at 2,043, 1 13. These conditions were a winding up of Eemland, a public

listing of its shares or a sale of the company to a third party. Id. at 25,

1 14.

99. Id. at 25, 15, reprinted in Eur. Community Cases (CCH Europe) at 2,045, 15.
Interest was capitalized until the principal became due under a balloon payment. Id.
100. Id. at 25-27, 11 12-20, reprinted in Eur. Community Cases (CCH Europe) at
2,043-2.046,
12-20.
101. United States v. Gillette Co., 1990-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 1 69,142 (D.D.C.July
25, 1990).
102. Id. 64,273.
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Eemland,1 3 other than via its limited preemption rights, without
the Justice Department's prior written consent. 4 Should it exercise those preemption rights, Gillette agreed to give an automatic proxy to Eemland to cast Gillette's votes in the same proportion as the votes cast by the other shareholders, thereby effectively negating any ability by Gillette to use these voting powers
to affect Eemland's activities.10 5 The Justice Department, therefore, concluded that these provisions, together with the fact that
Gillette had no voting interest or board or management representation in Eemland, eliminated the Department's original concerns that the transaction violated section 7 of the Clayton Act
and section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 0 6
A comparison of Gillette's minority interest and control
rights in Eemland with those held by Philip Morris strongly suggests that Gillette did not satisfy the influence standard prescribed by the Philip Morris Court for application of Articles 85
and 86. The Court of Justice found that Philip Morris could not
influence the commercial activities of Rothmans, despite having
a 24.9% voting interest, substantial preemption rights over the
sale of Rembrandt's controlling interest in Rothmans, and holding 50% of Rothmans' convertible bonds, because (i) Philip
Morris had no board representation, (ii) it agreed to implement
various Chinese Wall protections to insulate Rothmans from any
influence, and (iii) the only post-closing cooperation agreements between Philip Morris and Rothmans affected only their
non-EC operations. 1 7 In reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly rejected the complainants' theories that (i) the preemption rights restricted competition by enabling Philip Morris to
prevent any other entity from acquiring a controlling interest in
Rothmans, and (ii) the cooperation agreements covering operations located outside the Community would lead to the coordi103. The term "securities" was broadly defined to include both voting and nonvoting equity interests, as well as any forms of indebtedness. Id. 64,272.
104. Id. 64,273.
105. See id. 1 64,273-76; see also Gillette, O.J. L 116/21, at 27, 1 21, reprinted in Eur.
Community Cases (CCH Europe) at 2,046, 1 21.
106. See Gillette Co., 1990-2 Trade Cases (CCH)
69,142.
107. Philip Morris, [1987] E.C.R. at 4575-4579, 133, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 58 (noting
that they kept agreements to cooperate in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines) compare
with id., 1 47, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 61 (concluding that "1984 agreements do not contain
any provisions regarding commercial cooperation").
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nation of activities within the Community. 10 8
Like Philip Morris, Gillette had no board representation,
held preemption rights over other shareholder interests, which
were no greater than, and quite possibly more limited than those
held by Philip Morris, and agreed to implement Chinese Wall
provisions. 1°9 Unlike Philip Morris, Gillette held no voting interest and its nonvoting equity interest was only 22%, compared to
Philip Morris' 24.9% voting and 30.8% nonvoting equity interests."' Gillette held a significant percentage (13.6%) of Eemland's total debt, although Philip Morris held 50% of Rothmans
International's outstanding convertible bonds, which represented an unstated percentage of Rothmans' total debt."' The
only influence "plus factor" in Gillette vis-A-vis Philip Morris was
the existence of (non-EC) cooperation agreements between Gillette and Eemland, which appeared to involve more extensive
commercial activities and were more likely to have effects within
the Community than those in PhilipMorris.' 12 On balance, these
facts represented a weak basis for application of either Article
85 or Article 86 under the Court's Philip Morris influence standard.
Despite this apparent dilemma, the Commission concluded
that the nonvoting minority interest and other limited links with
Eemland would enable Gillette to exercise "some influence"
over Eemland's commercial activities, in violation of Article 86,
but not Article 85."1' In support, the Commission cited, without
elaboration, to Paragraph 65 of the Court's Philip Morris judgment, where the Court had used the term "some influence" in its
brief (four-sentence) Article 86 analysis, rather than the word
"influence" alone, which had been used in its Article 85 analy14

sis. 1

108. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text (discussing Philip Morris).
109. Gillette, O.J. L 116/21, at 25-27,
12-20, reprinted in Eur. Community Cases
(CCH Europe) at 2,043-46,
12-20.
110. Id.
111. Id.

112. Id. The Philip Morris cooperation agreements covered only operations in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Philip Morris, [1987] E.C.R. at 4577,
37-40,
[1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 59-60.
113. Gillette, O.J. L 116/21, at 25-27,
12-20, reprinted in Eur. Community Cases
(CCH Europe) at 2,043-46,
12-20.
114. See Gillette, O.J. L 116/21, at 27-28, 1 24, reprinted in Eur. Community Cases
(CCH Europe) at 2,047, 11 24.
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This raises the question whether the Court's use of the term
"some influence" was inadvertent or, as the Gillette decision suggests, was intended to create a lower control threshold for purposes of applying Article 86 to acquisitions of minority shareholdings. Until Gillette it seemed virtually certain that the Court
in Philip Morris intended to apply under Article 86 the identical
"influence" control threshold that it had applied and described
in detail in its preceding Article 85 analysis. This conclusion is
supported by the fact that BAT and R.J. Reynolds had argued
unsuccessfully to the Court ofJustice that Philip Morris' minority
investment violated Article 86, even if Philip Morris was unable
to influence Rothmans International." 5 Thus, despite the Commission's attempt to cloak its Gillette decision under the mantle
of the Court's judgment in PhilipMorris, it appears that the Commission expanded the Philip Morris influence standard to create
a new, lower control threshold for application of Article 86 to
acquisitions of minority interests.
Portions of the Gillette decision suggest that the Commission
recognized it was applying a new, lower control threshold to minority acquisitions by firms holding a dominant position. The
Commission acknowledged that Gillette's non-voting equity interest in Eemland was insufficient to trigger application of Article 85 under the Philip Morris influence standard.' 6 Nonetheless, the Commission emphasized that entities enjoying a dominant position have a "special responsibility not to allow [their]
conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition ......
thereby drawing a clear distinction between Article 85 and Article 86."7 The Commission proceeded to describe various means
by which Gillette could exercise "some influence" over Eemland,
even though some of the same rationales had been considered,
yet rejected by the Court of Justice as insufficient to satisfy the
"influence" standard for application of either Article 85 or Arti115. See Philip Morris, [1987] E.C.R. at 4560-61, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 47 (opinion of

Advocate General Mancini) (comparing complainants' argument that, for purposes of
establishing abuse under Article 86, "the extent of the control exercisable by an undertaking does not count" with Commission's counterargument that there can be no abuse
under Article 86 "if the investing company is not in a position to influence the undertaking in which it has a holding").
116. Gillette, O.J. L 116/21, at 29, 34, reprinted in Eur. Community Cases (CCH
Europe) at 2,049, 1 34.
117. Id. at 27, 23, reprinted in Eur. Community Cases (CCH Europe) at 2,046-47,

1 23.
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cle 86 in Philip Morris."8 It appears, therefore, that the Commission understood that it was creating a new "some influence" control threshold for application of Article 86 that is satisfied by a
significantly lower quantum of control rights than the "influence" standard utilized by the Court of Justice for application of
both Articles 85 and 86 in Philip Morris. 19
Although it appears unlikely that the Court of Justice in
Philip Morris intended a lower "some influence" control threshold to be applied to acquisitions of minority interests by dominant firms, such a rule could facilitate realization of several important antitrust policy objectives. While minority interests and
other links between non-dominant competitors can raise antitrust concerns, such as spillover collusion, these risks are presumptively greater, all else equal, if one of the entities enjoys a
dominant position. Given that minority acquisitions may also
create efficiencies or other procompetitive benefits, there appears to be a sound policy basis for requiring that a "higher"
control threshold, such as the Philip Morris influence test, be satisfied before minority acquisitions involving no dominant firm
are subjected to antitrust prohibition. When dominant firms are
involved, however, the potential harms to competition are pre118. Compare Gillette, O.J. L 116/21, at 28, 1 26-27, reprinted in Eur. Community
Cases (CCH Europe) at 2,047-48, 11 26-27 (setting forth Commission finding that Gillette's preemption and conversion rights allow Gillette to exercise "some influence"
over Eemland because Gillette can prevent third parties from acquiring and possibly
invigorating the competitive viability of Eemland) with Philip Morris, [1987] E.C.R. at
4577-82, 7 32-74, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 58-66 (setting forth Court ofJustice's contrary
finding that similar preemption rights allowed Philip Morris to "influence" Rothmans
because such rights enabled Philip Morris to prevent any third party from acquiring
Rothmans International and thereby strengthening its competitive viability).
119. See Gillette, O.J. L 116/21, at 28, 11 26-27, reprinted in Eur. Community Cases
(CCH Europe) at 2,047-48, It 26-27; Philip Morris, [1987] E.C.R. at 4577-82, 17 32-74,
[ 1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 58-66. An alternative explanation of the Gillette decision - that the
Commission applied the same control threshold as the Court in Philip Morris, but
merely found different facts in Gillette that satisfied this control test - seems less plausible. The Commission made only passing attempts to identify facts that would distinguish Gillette from Philip Morris. The Commission merely noted that (i) the dominant
firm in Philip Morris was the entity in which the minority interest was acquired, whereas
the acquiring firm in Gillette held the dominant position; and (ii) the acquired entity in
Gillette was highly leveraged and weakened by its debt burden, which was held in part by
the acquiring firm - financial conditions that were absent in Philip Morris. See Gillette,
0.J. L 116/21, at 28, 1 24 & 29. If the Commission actually believed that these facts
were sufficient to enable the Gillette transaction to satisfy the Philip Morris influence
standard, presumably it would have stated so explicitly and found that Gillette's participation in the Eemland buy-out violated both Article 85 and Article 86.
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sumptively greater, thereby justifying regulatory intervention at a
lower control/influence threshold.
Gillette represents the clearest signal that the Commission is
likely to rely on a significantly lower control threshold for purposes of applying Article 86 to minority shareholdings between
*competitors. Other Commission decisions, under the Merger
Regulation, also suggest that the Commission will carefully scrutinize acquisitions of even very small minority interests among
competitors, if at least one firm enjoys a dominant position.
In Alcatel/Telettra120 the Spanish state-owned telecommunications operator, Telefonica, held minority interests in the two
telecom equipment suppliers whose combination was the subject
of the proposed concentration.1 21 Because Telefonica was likely
to remain a monopsonistic, or near-monopsonistic, buyer of
most telecom equipment in Spain and would not be subject to
the provisions of the EC's public procurement transparency directive for several years, the Commission obtained Alcatel's
(Phase I) undertaking to acquire these minority interests from
Telefonica to sever the vertical links that the Commission feared
would give the combined Alcatel/Telettra a purchasing preference vis-A-vis competing telecom suppliers.
In STET, Italtel, AT&T and AT&T-NSI1 22 two suppliers of
telecommunications equipment, who operated in different
Member States, acquired 20% cross-shareholdings in each other
and entered into a variety of agreements providing for technological cooperation (exchanges and licensing of technical information and patents, technical assistance and joint product development) and commercial cooperation (cross distribution and
purchasing agreements, as well as establishment ofjoint marketing subsidiaries in countries where neither operated). One supplier, Italtel, was part of the vertically integrated Italian telecom
group, STET, which also controlled the national telephone mo120. Alcatel/Telettra, cited in O.J. L 122/48 (1991), Case No. IV/M.042 (Eur.
Comm'n Apr. 12, 1991) 11 20-22, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Jan. 1992) at
117.
121. Id. Alcatel proposed to acquire sole control of the Italian company, Telettra.
Telefonica owned a 5.4% interest in Telettra, a 10% interest in Telettra's Spanish subsidiary and a 21.14% interest in Alcatel's Spanish subsidiary. Id.
122. Commission Notice, O.J. C 333/3 (1992). The transaction was notified to the
Commission (seeking an Article 85(3) exemption or comfort letter) in July 1989,
before implementation of the Merger Regulation. Id.
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nopoly. 123 Despite the parent's dominant position in providing
voice telephone services in Italy, the Commission nonetheless
concluded that the transaction qualified for exemption under
Article 85(3) after the parties gave undertakings designed to address the Commission's vertical foreclosure and discrimination
concerns. The Commission appears to have based this exemption, in part, on the parties' showing that neither of the two
telecom equipment suppliers enjoyed a dominant position in
the supply of
telecom equipment in Italy or elsewhere in the
124
Community.
A critical question now-facing firms and their legal advisors
is when will minority, interests and other so-called structural links
between competitors trigger application of Article 86? Gillette
suggests that the degree of structural links necessary to trigger
Article 86 may be very low, at least when the acquiring entity
already holds a dominant position, although clear guidance is
absent from the Commission's decision. 25 Confusion in this
area may be compounded by the Italian-FlatGlass case, where
the Court of First Instance held that competitors (none of which
individually holds a single-firm dominant position) may abuse a
joint or collective dominant position under Article 86 if they create sufficient structural or economic links between themselves in
a highly oligopolistic industry.1 2 6 Do the same or different
"structural links" trigger Gillette's "some influence" standard and
the Italian Flat Glass 'Joint dominance" standard? Commission
guidance would be welcomed in this increasingly murky area.
B. Shifting the Upper Boundary of the Philip Morris Influence
Standard?- "Back Door" Application of Article 85 to
Concentrations
The Gillette decision may also have introduced a novel interpretation of the PhilipMorris influence standard to allow Article
123. Id. The other supplier, AT&T-NSI (including its ultimate parent, AT&T) did
not have a dominant position in any part of the Community. Id.
124. See id. 26.
125. Id. For example, was the financing provided by Gillette, which resulted in
Eemland being highly leveraged, the key factor that led the Commission to conclude
that Gillette had abused its dominant position, or was it the other links that may or may
not have allowed Gillette to exercise any influence over Eemland?
126. See Societa Italiano Vetro SpA, Fabbrica Pisana SpA and PPG Vernante Pennitalia SpA v. Commission, Joined Cases T-68 & 77-78/89, at 171 & 174, (Eur. Comm'n
Mar. 10, 1992)
350 & 358 (1992).
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85 to be applied, in effect via the "back door," to prohibit 100%
acquisitions and other clear-cut concentrations. The Commission held that Eemland's agreement to transfer the non-EC (and
non-North American) operations, including intellectual property rights, to Gillette, together with the related product supply
and noncompete agreements, resulted in an "artificial" geographic separation of the Wilkinson Sword business and, thus,
an unavoidable, ongoing commercial cooperation between competitors in neighboring markets (i.e. the EC and non-EC European countries), in violation of Article 85(1).127 Gillette was ordered to divest back to Eemland all of the Wilkinson Sword operations and9 assets in the EFTA128 countries, Eastern Europe and
Turkey.

12

Gillette's "artificial" geographic break-up theory raises several interesting questions. Is this application of Article 85 to prohibit a concentration perhaps a new variation of the "separability" concept, pursuant to which a concentration accompanied by
"inseparable," yet nonetheless "non-ancillary" agreements requiring post-closing performance requires the entire transaction
to be cast outside the jurisdiction of the Merger Regulation and
subjected instead to Article 85 review?13 0 Should this application
of Article 85 to a concentration be viewed as a unique exception
that is unlikely to be invoked again by the Commission (e.g., because the Gillette/Eemland transaction preceded the effective
date of the Merger Regulation) or are we facing the dawn of a
potentially significant jurisdictional expansion of Article 85 to
reach, for example, any "artificial" concentration that "inevitably" leads to post-closing coordination between the relevant parties (and, if so, by what criteria are these concepts to be defined
and applied)? Several reasons indicate that Gillette should (and
probably will) be strictly construed and, ultimately, limited to the
unique facts presented in that case.
First, the Commission can easily (albeit formalistically) distinguish future cases from Gillette. The Gillette/Eemland trans127. See Gil/ette, OJ. L 116/21, at 29 & 31, 1 34 & 43, reprinted in Eur. Community
Cases (CCH Europe) at 2,047-48, 11 26-27.
128. The seven members of the European Free Trade Association ("EFTA") are
Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Liechtenstein.
129. Id.
130. See 1990 Joint Venture Notice, supra note 10, OJ. C 203/10, at 10, 1 (discussing application of Article 85 and 86).
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action was completed before implementation of the Merger Regulation, a factor that will not be present in future concentrations. The Commission can therefore avoid future applications
of Article 85 to concentrations involving purported "artificial
break-ups" by merely citing to the Merger Regulation's exclusive
jurisdiction over concentrations.
Second, there is no policy justification for an application of
Article 85 to concentrations beyond the unique fact scenario
presented in Gillette. The "one-stop shopping," reduced transaction costs and legal certainty benefits created by the Merger Regulation's exclusive jurisdiction strongly support no application of
Article 85's automatic nullity provisions to concentrations, except in the most extraordinary circumstances. Numerous transactions involve a sale of part of a business and/or a variety of
related agreements requiring post-closing performance between
the buyer and seller of the business, such as product supply
agreements, intellectual property licenses, and joint R&D. If Gillette is not strictly limited to its facts, what should the standards
be to determine whether a sale of part of a business is sufficiently
"artificial" and involves a sufficient risk of post-closing coordination to trigger prohibition (and later divestiture) under Article
85? There is no need to open a jurisdictional Pandora's box by
applying Article 85 to concentrations, especially given that concentrations which do not satisfy the Merger Regulation's Community dimension thresholds remain subject to Member State
enforcement. Both the number of and enforcement activities
under Member State merger control laws have increased significantly over the past several years. This weighs against creating
an exception to the general rule that Article 85 does not apply to
concentrations. 131

Third, a recent case involving very similar facts, but reviewed by the Commission after implementation of the Merger
Regulation, suggests that the Commission is likely to strictly con131. Admittedly, this factor appears to have played little if any role in the Commission's Gillette analysis, given that several Member State authorities were known to be
investigating the transaction at the behest of the same complainants. Remedies were
eventually imposed in Germany, which reportedly prohibited the transaction, France,
and the United Kingdom. See, e.g., MERGERS & ACQuisITIONs INT'L, Jan. 1993, at 10
(Fr.); EC Commission Imposes Conditions to Clear Ventures for SanitaryProtection Products, 63
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 152 (July 30, 1992) (Ger.); Competition Act 1980,
[1992] 3 E.C.L.R. R-80 (U.K.).

1994]

MINORITY SHAREHOIDINGS UNDER EEC LAW

327

strue Gillette. CCIEL/GTE 1 32 involved a geographic break-up of
GTE's worldwide indoor lamps and lighting fixtures business.
Siemens, apparently realizing it would likely face antitrust obstacles in Europe, arranged through various agreements that it
would acquire the North American portion of this business,
while the non-North American portion would be acquired in a
buy-out by a management and investor group ("EDIL") led by a
Citibank entity, CCIEL.
Siemens acquired no voting or non-voting equity interest in
EDIL and had no board representation or access to EDIL's confidential business information.1 33 Siemens provided short-term
bridge financing for the buy-out, which was equivalent to more
than half the purchase price owed by EDIL.' 4 This financing,
however, involved limited creditor rights, for example, Siemens
had no right to accelerate repayment or to place EDIL into
bankruptcy for failure to make interest or principal payments
and EDIL could prepay at any time. Moreover, the financing
involved no conversion or preemption rights affecting EDIL's
equity, although Siemens could obtain 5% of the value of EDIL
on its sale or listing if EDIL failed to repay the principal within
35
two years of it becoming due.'
The parties did execute several related agreements requiring post-closing transfers of R&D, products and intellectual
property rights.13 6 The North American operations acquired by
Siemens will provide to EDIL, pursuant to agreements lasting up
to ten years, intellectual property (patents and technical information) on a royalty-free basis, engineering support services,
manufacturing apparatus and input components at cost on a
non-exclusive, arms length basis. A separate agreement provided that Siemens' North American operations will supply EDIL
with finished products, also at cost, for a period of four years.
The Commission reviewed and cleared this transaction
under the Merger Regulation, not Article 85.13" Because EDIL's
132. CCIE/GTE, cited in O.J. C 258/10 (1992), Case No. IV/M.258 (Eur. Comm'n
Sept. 25, 1992) 11 1-12, 29-33, reprinted in EEC MERGER CONTROL REP. (Jan. 1993) at
113-15, 119-20.
133. Id.
134. Three-quarters of the loan balance was due in three years, with the remainder
due on the fourth anniversary. Id.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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buy-out of the non-North American operations resulted in no
changes in market shares or other industry characteristics within
the Community, the Commission focused on whether the links
between Siemens and EDIL created by the loan financing and
various post-closing agreements would adversely affect conditions of competition within the Community, given the industry's
high concentration ratio, barriers to entry and other oligopolis138
tic characteristics.
The Commission concluded that the arrangements did not
give Siemens decisive influence over EDIL. 1 9 The Commission
emphasized that the debt financing provided by Siemens was of
limited duration, involved no shareholder rights or extraordinary creditor rights, did not worsen the debt-to-equity ratio of
the non-North American operations acquired by EDIL, gave
EDIL a three-year grace period on principal payments, and included a graduated interest rate provision that created an incentive for EDIL to refinance the loan, with third parties, as soon as
possible. Regarding the post-closing R&D, intellectual property
and supply agreements, the Commission adopted a similar analysis, noting that they were of limited duration, involved only a
"one-way" flow of information and created incentives for EDIL to
develop alternative sources as soon as possible. Although the
Commission suggested that these arrangements might give Siemens "some limited influence" over EDIL (emphasis added), the
Commission did not engage in any Article 85 (or Article 86)
analysis, but instead cleared all the arrangements under the
Merger Regulation as ancillary restrictions to the underlying
concentration. 4 0
There are extensive similarities and only modest differences
between the factual circumstances presented in Gillette and
CCIEL/GTE. For example, both cases involved highly concentrated markets with substantial barriers to entry, although Gillette's leading firm market share in the EC was significantly
higher than Siemens' market share, which appears to have been
well below the 50% range (i.e. no single firm dominance in
CCIEL/GTE).' 4 1 Both cases involved a geographic break-up of a
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. at 896-97, 11 23-29.
Id.
See id. at 894 & 897-98, 1 12 & 30-33.
Compare Gillette, O.J. L 116/21, at 23, 1 8, rqprinted in Eur. Community Cases
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worldwide business, although Gillette involved a separation of European operations (EC versus EFTA), whereas CC1EL/GTE arguably involved a less "artificial" division whereby all European
operations were kept together. Both cases involved a competitor
providing. substantial financing for the buy-out, although the
competitor in Gillette obtained conversion and preemption
rights that potentially affected the buy-out entity's voting share
capital and the buy-out entity appears to have been more highly
leveraged in Gillette.'4 2 Both cases involved several commercial
agreements requiring post-closing transfers of products and
technology. Indeed, the magnitude of these agreements was arguably greater in CCIEL/GTE. The Commission, however,
claimed that the "flow" of such transfers would be one-way in
CCIEL/GTE and, perhaps more importantly, Gillette included an
agreement expressly contemplating allocating customers on a
geographic basis, enforcing the geographic separation of the
Wilkinson business. Perhaps the most significant differences between the two cases were that (i) Gillette preceded whereas
CCIEL/GTE followed implementation of the Merger Regulation,
and (ii) the parties in Gillette apparently tried to structure their
deal to avoid antitrust review, thereby perhaps inviting more aggressive antitrust scrutiny by the Commission, whereas the parties in CCIEL/GTE appear to have had no desire (or perhaps
opportunity) to attempt to avoid EC review.
CCIEL/GTE indicates that the Commission should have little, if any, incentive to apply Gillette in future cases. Given the
Commission's remedial powers under the Merger Regulation,
which are equivalent to those under Regulation 17, and the
Commission's increasing willingness to condition clearances on
the parties agreeing to modify the terms of their transactions,
including agreements requiring post-closing performance, the
Commission has the means to require parties in future "geo(CCH Europe) at 2,041,
8, with CCEL/GTE, cited in O.J. C 258/10 (1992), Case No.
IV/M.258 (Eur. Comm'n Sept. 25, 1992) 1 23.
142. CCIE/GTE, cited in Oj. C 258/10 (1992), Case No. IV/M.258 (Eur. Comm'n

Sept. 25, 1992)

23, reprinted in EEC

MERGER CONTROL REP.

(Jan. 1993). The 22%

"equity" (i.e. loan stock) interest in Gillette is not a significant distinguishing factor from
CCIEL/GTE, given that this "equity" interest included no voting rights, board or management representation, control rights or access to internal business information. Id. at
28,
25. In other words, Gillette's non-voting "equity" was functionally equivalent to
debt financing for purposes of assessing whether the holder can exercise any degree of
influence over the entity's commercial activities.
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graphic break-up" transactions to "reduce" their links sufficiently
to prevent competitors from influencing one another.14 The
Merger Regulation perhaps offers an additional benefit of
mandatory notification - i.e. geographic break-up transactions,
if characterized as concentrations, are subject to mandatory notification (if not under the Merger Regulation, then at the Member State level). In contrast, characterizing such transactions as
satisfying the Philip Morris influence standard under Article 85
might allow transactions that are less well-known than the Gillette/Eemland deal (or that do not involve competitor complaints) to escape regulatory review.
CONCLUSION

Significant shifts have occurred during the past three years
in the control thresholds that determine whether an acquisition
of a minority shareholding will be subject to one or more EEC
competition laws. The scope and effects of these shifts are
neither clear nor necessarily consistent. The Commission appears on the one hand to have expanded the Merger Regulation's concept of decisive influence to reach a variety of minority
shareholdings previously falling within the Philip Morris influence standard, while on the other hand to have expanded the
Philip Morris influence standard to reach not only transactions
previously thought to be passive (i.e. no influence), but perhaps
also concentrations that are normally subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Merger Regulation, vis-a-vis Articles 85 and 86.
Whether these control thresholds will continue to shift is
critically important to firms contemplating the legal certainty of
their future investments. Eventually, the Commission may conclude that the potential benefits of "flexible" control thresholds
are outweighed by the costs, such as reduced legal certainty,
higher transaction costs (both public and private) and slower
decisionmaking capabilities. Simpler, albeit less flexible, thresholds may ultimately be required to control these shifting sands.

143. Indeed, such modifications may have occurred in CCIEL/GTE (e.g., during
pre-notification meetings with Commission), especially given that the Commission's
then-pending investigation of the Gillette/Eemland transaction was well known at the
time.

